Metaethics: Moral Realism vs. Antirealism
Metaethics: Moral Realism vs. Antirealism
💡 Key Takeaways
- Define and contrast moral realism vs. moral anti-realism: objectivity of moral facts versus attitude- or truth-conditional claims.
- Identify major sub-theories in each camp (realism: naturalist and non-naturalist realism; anti-realism: expressivism/emotivism, error theory, constructivism) and their core claims.
- Explain how each view treats moral truth, justification, and moral discourse (cognitive vs. non-cognitive accounts).
- Consider practical implications for disagreement, moral progress, and cross-cultural ethics under different metaethical theories.
❓ Frequently Asked Questions
What is moral realism in metaethics?
Moral realism is the view that there are objective moral facts—truths about right and wrong that hold independently of anyone's beliefs, desires, or cultures.
What is moral antirealism in metaethics?
Moral antirealism denies mind-independent moral facts. Moral judgments depend on attitudes, cultures, or non-cognitive states (e.g., expressions of approval or commands). Major forms include subjectivism, error theory, and non-cognitivism/expressivism.
How might realists justify moral claims?
Realists argue that moral discourse presupposes objective reasons, point to moral progress, and note patterns of cross-cultural agreement that suggest there are truth-conduct standards beyond personal views.
What are common criticisms of moral realism?
Critics point to the is-ought problem, persistent moral disagreement, and the difficulty of empirically locating moral facts. Antirealists reply by reframing morality as non-cognitive or culture-relative.